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Abstract 
 The purpose of this thesis is to explore the early and smaller espionage tactics during the 
American Revolution and compare them to the established Culper Ring. George Washington, the 
American general and later president, and Benjamin Tallmadge, the Director of Military 
Intelligence during the war, looked for a way to revolutionize espionage at the time. Prior to the 
Culper Ring, espionage was done on a small scale. Single spies were the most common form of 
espionage. Washington and Tallmadge knew they needed something new and worked to create 
something that would last and become sustainable. They were able to create an organized spy 
ring that remained hidden and proved to be very fruitful to the war. The ring challenged the 
concept of traditional British honor that was the cultural norm at the time. They found their 
success by employing the use of agents that fell outside of this cultural norm. They shaped the 
future of spying in the United States. The work done by this ring laid a foundation for espionage 
agents to build on in the future. The methods used by the Culper Ring were top notch for their 
day and kept their secrets safe throughout the course of the war. The Culper Ring was vital to the 
success of the American Revolution; without the intelligence they gained, the war might have 
ended differently. This thesis examines how they were able to find as much success as they did 
while comparing them to other American espionage units as well as British espionage units.  
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Timeline of the American Revolution 
1775 
April 18: Rides of Paul Revere and William Dawes 
April 19: Battle of Lexington and Concord and the Shot Heard Round the World  
May 10: The Second Continental Congress meets in Philadelphia  
June 15: George Washington named Commander in Chief 
June 17: Battle of Bunker Hill 
1776 
July 4: Congress adopts the Declaration of Independence  
August 2: Delegates sign Declaration of Independence  
August 27: Redcoats defeat Washington’s army in Battle of Long Island 
September 8: Nathan Hale sent into New York 
September 15: British occupy New York City 
September 22: Nathan Hale hanged as a spy 
December 25: Washington crosses the Delaware  
December 26: The Battle of Trenton  
1777 
April 27: Benedict Arnold’s troops force a British retreat at Ridgefield, Connecticut  
July 27: Lafayette arrives in Philadelphia 
September 26: British under Howe occupy Philadelphia  
December 19: Washington’s troops retire to Valley Forge 
1778 
February 6: The United States and France sign the French Alliance  
March 7: General William Howe replaced by Henry Clinton 
June 18: British leave Philadelphia in favor of New York 
June 19: Washington’s army leaves Valley Forge 
1778 
August 25: Washington impressed by Tallmadge’s find of Woodhull 
October 29: Benjamin Tallmadge promoted to Director of Military Intelligence  
October 29: First Samuel Culper Letter from Woodhull 
1780 
September 23: John Andre arrested, Benedict Arnold’s plan to cede West Point exposed  
1781 
March 2: Articles of Confederation adopted  
October 19: Cornwallis surrounded on land and sea by Americans and surrenders at Yorktown 
1782 
November 30: British and Americans sign preliminary Articles of Peace 
1783 
September 3: The United States and Great Britain sign the Treaty of Paris 
November 25: British troops leave New York City  
December 23: Washington resigns as Commander in Chief
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Introduction 
Espionage in the American Revolution began as an unorganized mess. It underwent a 
shift midway through the war that resulted in the genesis the Culper Ring. Created in 1778, the 
Culper Ring represented a new age of espionage in the American Revolution. This thesis looks at 
different aspects and characteristics of the ring that set it apart from other espionage efforts 
during the war. This paper also compares and contrasts the Ring with other American espionage 
agents as well as the British espionage effort during the war.  
The best resource I have found on the Culper Ring is Washington’s Spies: The Story of 
America’s First Spy Ring by Alexander Rose. Rose analyzes the Culper Ring and presents the 
case that this Spy ring was the first of its kind. This claim is common in academic circles. While 
there are many claims that the Culper Ring holds the title of America’s first spy ring, Rose 
presents his argument in a clear and concise manner that is easy to understand. I believe that 
Rose misses the crucial step that this thesis examines. While the Culper Ring was the first spy 
ring in America, it also represented a shift in theory and thought process about espionage itself. 
At the beginning of the war, espionage operations typically consisted of lone agents placed in 
their locations with no help or support. Their primary goals were to obtain information on the 
British and relay that information back to the Continental Army. By 1778, it was clear this was 
not an effective form of espionage. It found limited success with an abundance of failure and 
death. When George Washington established the Culper Ring, he did so out of the necessity to 
create a more successful and reliable operation.  
In order to examine how espionage in the American Revolution experienced a shift in 
thought process, it is first imperative to examine the existing espionage units prior to the Culper 
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Ring. The first section of this thesis examines the success and failure of different American 
espionage agents during the early years of the war. Not only does the first section serve as an 
introduction to the covert operations of the war, it provides an overview of how each success and 
failure played a role in the eventual change in process that Washington implanted with the 
formation of the Ring. This section introduces key players that caused this change and how each 
downfall brought Washington one step closer to the formation of the Culper Ring. This section 
concludes prior to the formation of the Culper Ring, which is the focus of the next section.  
The second section of this thesis looks at the Culper Ring itself. This section provides an 
overview of how the Ring functioned and how it was an improvement over the spies in the 
previous section. The Culper Ring was revolutionary, as they had members stationed in different 
locations throughout New York and provided support to each other. The formation of this Ring 
represented a shift in how the leaders of the American forces saw espionage and how they took 
steps to ensure a better process in terms of espionage. This section examines the key members of 
the Culper Ring, their background and motivation, and how they worked together to pass 
information from New York to General Washington.  
The third section of this thesis discusses honor and espionage. During this period in 
history, honor was very important to both British and American societies. However, both parties 
bent the traditional rules on honor in order to participate in espionage. This section provides 
background and insight on why honor was such an important factor to society and the reason 
behind each side bending the rules. This ability to overlook honor at times, even by some of the 
most honor bound individuals in history, reflects the ongoing shift taking place at this time. 
Washington was able to participate in espionage because he had to do something to overcome his 
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British adversaries. Washington bending the rules in order to secure intelligence against the 
enemy shows how important espionage became to the Americans.  
Something that made the Culper Ring as successful as they were was their use of gender 
roles and social stances. The Culper Ring utilized both women and slaves in their espionage 
operations, as these particular demographics were severely overlooked by those in charge. The 
use of these people by the Culper Ring, as well as other intelligence operations during the war, 
reveals that these demographics found it easier to get away with espionage. Changing the way 
the Army looked at espionage included understanding how people outside of the cultural normal 
of the time could be useful. This section views how the Culper Ring used and pushed these 
cultural boundaries and provides examples from the war on how women and slaves impacted the 
espionage effort.  
The fifth section of this thesis focusses on the methods of the Culper Ring. Recognizing 
the methods used by the Ring is imperative in understanding how the shift in espionage 
physically occurred. The first half of the chapter examines the Culper Ring’s Codebook and the 
invisible ink they used. These two are important as they show the technological advances the 
Culper Ring had at their disposal and how it was important to provide espionage agents with 
proper equipment to successfully carry out their mission. The second half of the chapter looks at 
how the Ring itself functioned. Understanding this is important to understanding the overall shift 
from singular espionage units to the more complex Culper Ring. This section is key in revealing 
the physical evidence of this thesis claim.  
The Culper Ring owed its success to how George Washington and Benjamin Tallmadge 
looked at espionage. The sixth section looks at the Ring’s success throughout the war and 
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examines some of its major victories. This section shows how the Ring was successful on at least 
four separate and important occasions. This section really gauges how imperative the shift in 
thinking was to the success of intelligence during the war. Instead of the limited success and high 
failure from the beginning of the war, the Culper Ring was able to pass accurate information 
successfully to Washington.  
The seventh section of this thesis examines British espionage during the war. While they 
had limited success and a few minor victories, it is clear that the British intelligence during the 
war was not functioning at the same capacity as the American intelligence. This shows how the 
superiors in charge of both parties were different. Washington put a lot of thought and energy 
into the American espionage effort while the British effort existed and functioned only as a 
necessity to try to keep up with Washington. This contrast is important in understanding the role 
espionage played on the war and how not changing and evolving was detrimental to the British.  
These sections function as a key to unlocking the change that Washington instituted 
during the war. Each section plays an important part in understanding the overall goal of 
espionage during the war and how things like honor, race, and gender played into that goal. As 
Nathaniel Greene said in a letter to John Clark, “Intelligence is the life of everything in war.”1 
While traditional and early intelligence efforts did not yield much fruit, Washington was able to 
learn from his mistakes. He created one of the most revolutionary organizations in American 
history. By challenging the traditional stance on espionage, Washington created one of the best 
spy rings to exist.  
  
                                               
1 Nathaniel Greene to John Clark. November 5, 1777.  
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Espionage Background 
 The purpose of this section is to outline espionage activities prior to the formation of the 
Culper Ring. Examining these activities gives insight into why the Culper Ring was necessary 
and how the Culper Ring transformed espionage during the war. 
 Espionage had many faces during the American Revolution. Prior to the start of the war, 
secret organizations met to determine the future of the colonies. The first of these organizations 
was the Loyal Nine. As a response to the Stamp Act, a group of nine patriots came together in 
1765 to operate against the British. As these nine patriots gained support and momentum, they 
formed the Sons of Liberty. The Sons of Liberty sparked a resistance movement against the 
British and laid important groundwork for covert operations. The Sons of Liberty, and its sister 
organization, The Daughters of Liberty, was incredibly influential in the colonies prior to the 
start of the war. The Sons of Liberty carried out the famous Boston Tea Party and began uniting 
colonists against the Crown. These organizations were not solely focused on espionage and 
intelligence. Rather, their main goal was to recruit members to their cause and support the 
residents of the colonies that stood against the tyrannical acts of the King. They operated in 
secrecy and maintained many characteristics and practices that espionage agents held dear. Not 
only were these organizations precursors to a free and independent nation, they were precursors 
to the espionage rings and organizations that brought that freedom to the United States.2  
 Perhaps one of the most famous spies of the American Revolution was Paul Revere. 
Gaining fame for his Midnight Ride, Revere was influential in early intelligence before the war. 
                                               
2 Ramsbey, Thomas W. The Sons of Liberty: The Early Inter-Colonial Organization. 
International Review of Modern Sociology. Vol. 17, No. 2 (Autumn 1987). Page 313-335. 
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As the British planned to move out of Boston and capture Samuel Adams and John Hancock, 
Revere was given the task of warning the revolutionary leaders. Because the Battles of 
Lexington and Concord marked the beginning of the American Revolution, Paul Revere’s ride is 
one of, if not the, earliest acts of intelligence during the war. While Paul Revere typically gains 
all the credit for his midnight ride, he did not carry out his task alone and in fact was captured 
during the night. Two other men, William Dawes and Samuel Prescott, accompanied Revere on 
his mission to warn the colonial leadership. En route to Concord, Dawes and Revere encountered 
Prescott. He offered his services to help the pair and the trio pressed on to Concord. They ran 
into trouble on the way there and both Dawes and Revere were not able to continue the journey. 
Revere was captured, detained for a time, then let go, while Dawes was thrown from his horse 
and had to walk back to Lexington. Prescott, originally not even a part of the mission, eventually 
became the sole hope for warning Concord of the impending British doom. He recruited others to 
help spread the word on the way and eventually made it to Concord successfully. While only 
Paul Revere is remembered for this heroic mission that sparked the war for independence, he had 
help and support from countless individuals. These individuals were able to successfully pass 
along important information to aid the rebellion.3  
 John Brown of Pittsfield, Massachusetts was an important individual during the first year 
of the American Revolution. He was part of a delegation sent to Montreal and was able to 
observe the status of the area around Lake Champlain on his way to Canada. While it was 
determined that Canada was not joining the Continental Congress, he was able to report on Fort 
                                               
3 Fischer, David Hackett. Paul Reveres Ride. Norwalk, CT.: Easton Press, 1996. 
 
  7 
Ticonderoga off of Lake Champlain. He made it clear that the fort was an important feature and 
had to be taken as quickly as possible following the outbreak of war.4 Following the battle at Fort 
Ticonderoga, Brown accused Benedict Arnold of being a traitor. The two had their share of 
differences and whether or not the accusation was true at the time, it was a bold statement to 
make. Arnold, of course, would turn out to be the most infamous traitor in American history. It 
might have even been this accusation that planted the thought of treachery in Arnold’s head. 
While Brown’s name will not go down in history as the most prominent figure in American 
espionage, he was key for certain aspects of the intelligence flow during the war.  
 The Committee of Secret Correspondence, The Committees of Safety, and the Committee 
on Spies were created in the early years of the American Revolution. The main goal of the 
Committee of Secret Correspondence was to provide Congress with foreign contact and aid.5 The 
Committee of Secret Correspondence became the Committee of Foreign Affairs in April 1777. 
The Committees of Safety existed in different colonies as a form of assembly to give citizens a 
voice during the revolution. These committees were influential in assisting local espionage 
agents such as Enoch Crosby.6 The Committee on Spies was not created to spy, instead it was 
created to punish spies. Congress appointed leading members to decide the fate of those giving 
intelligence and aid to the British. On August 21, 1776, the Committee on Spies outlined the 
parameters of espionage activity and the punishment of those found guilty. “RESOLVED, That 
all persons not members of, nor owing allegiance to, any of the United States of America, as 
                                               
4 Cruger, Van Schaack Henry. Memoirs of the Life of Henry Van Schaack, Embracing Selections 
from His Correspondence during the American Revolution. Chicago: A.C. McClurg, 1892. 
5 Journals of the Continental Congress, Volume 3. November 29, 1775. Library of Congress. 
6 The Committees of Safety of Westmoreland and Fincaste. 1774-1776. Virginia State Library. 
Page 9-11. 
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described in a resolution to the Congress of the 29th of June last, who shall be found lurking as 
spies in or about the fortification or encampments of the armies of the United States, or of any of 
them, shall suffer death, according to the law and usage of nations, by sentence of a court 
martial, or such either punishment as such court martial may direct.”7 Alexander Rose briefly 
discusses New York’s Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies. He describes it as 
“the enforcement arm of the political revolutionaries.”8 The creation of these committees was 
imperative to the Continental involvement in espionage.   
 A handful of singular agents filled the role of American espionage agents from 1775 to 
1777. One of the earliest spies for Washington’s army was William H. Dobbs. In 1775, Dobbs 
was a boat captain in New York. He was tasked as a lookout and gathered intelligence on the 
British naval movements to report back to Washington. His service in intelligence ended 
following a confusing incident between Continental troops and a British man under the 
supervision of Dobbs. While not much is known of the incident, both Dobbs and the man under 
his supervision ended up in custody as the Continental troops were alarmed and upset by their 
presence.9 
 George Washington faced one of the best armies in the world during the American 
Revolution. With failures in New York, his Continental Army was slowly, but surely fighting a 
losing battle. The fall of New York in 1776, a huge British victory, was one not forgotten by 
Washington. In Barnet Schecter’s The Battle of New York; The City at the Heart of the American 
                                               
7 Journals of the Continental Congress, Volume 5. August 21, 1776. Library of Congress. 
8 Rose, Alexander. Washington’s Spies: The Story of Americas First Spy Ring. New York: 
Bantam Books Trade Paperbacks, 2014. Page 42. 
9 Minutes of New York Committee of Safety, items 21-25 January 1776, in NDAR III, 902-903, 
979. Library of Congress. 
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Revolution, Washington’s tactics during the battle are applauded, “Washington’s flawless 
evacuation of Brooklyn is one of the greatest moments in the annals of warfare.” British-
occupied New York quickly became the focal point for British activity in America. The 
ingenuity displayed by Washington during his evacuation of New York continued to be shown 
through his plans to gain insight into the city. Now, more than ever, Washington needed eyes in 
New York.10  
 Perhaps the best-known American spy during the Revolutionary War was perhaps one of 
the most unsuccessful. A bright and eager young man ready to serve his country, Nathan Hale is 
immortalized as “America’s first spy.” Hale grew up in Massachusetts and attended Yale 
University. He joined the army after his good friend and confidant, Benjamin Tallmadge, wrote 
him on the importance of service to their new country. Unbeknownst to the two at the time, these 
men would go on to change the course of the war. Hale answered General Washington’s call for 
an espionage agent, saying that he “owed to his country the accomplishment of an object so 
important and so much desired by the commander of her armies.”11 Washington now had a spy 
to send into New York. Although he was one of the most widely known and celebrated spies of 
the Revolutionary War, Hale’s operation was a complete failure. He gathered very little 
information and made crucial mistakes that directly led to his capture and execution on 
September 22, 1776.12 While his famous line “I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my 
                                               
10 Schecter, Barnet. The Battle for New York: The City at the Heart of the American Revolution. 
London: Jonathan Cape, 2003. Page 154. 
11 Rose. Washington’s Spies. Page 17. 
12 Howe, William. Orderly Book. January 6, 1776-September 4, 1777. The Gilder Lehrman 
Institute of American History. 
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country,” was not his last words, nor were they his at all, these words immortalized his image as 
the founding father of American espionage.  
A British Loyalist, Consider Tiffany, wrote of Hale’s capture, “But in the height of their 
conversation, a company of soldiers surrounded the house, and by orders from the commander, 
seized Capt Hale in an instant. But denying his name, and the business he came upon, he was 
ordered to New York. But before he was carried far, several persons knew him and called him by 
name; upon this he was hanged as a spy, some say, without being brought before a court 
martial.”13 Hale acted brave and absolute in the face of death while remaining loyal to his 
country to the end. Eventually Washington learned from his mistakes, however, espionage agents 
worked as lone operatives or in pairs for the next few years. While organizations like the 
Committees of Safety provided these agents some form of relief, they were still very much alone 
playing an incredibly dangerous game with mixed degrees of success.14   
 Throughout 1776 and 1777, espionage agents came and went with more failure than 
success. Operatives and agents for the revolution were placed under constant scrutiny, especially 
in New York. Individuals such as Haym Salomon found British occupied New York to be rather 
unfriendly and unwelcoming. Arrested multiple times for giving support and intelligence to the 
Continental Army, he eventually had to flee to the side of the rebels. He was initially arrested 
around the same time Nathan Hale was caught in New York.15 Another spy was arrested and put 
to death in New York in June of 1777. Abraham Patten was caught by British authorities, tried, 
                                               
13 Tiffany, Consider. Manuscript History of the American Revolution. Library of Congress. 
14 Hutson, James. Nathan Hale Revisited. Library of Congress. 
15 Schwartz, Laurens R. Jews and the American Revolution: Haym Salomon and Others. 
Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1987. 
 
  11 
and convicted of espionage acts against the Crown.16 Word of his death was posted in the local 
New York newspaper and is discussed in a correspondence between John Hancock and George 
Washington. Washington wrote, “You will observe by the New York paper, the execution of 
Abraham Patten. His family well deserves the generous notice of Congress. He conducted 
himself with great fidelity to our cause rendering Services and has fallen a sacrifice in promoting 
her Interest. Perhaps a public act of generosity, considering the character he was in, might not be 
so eligible, as a private donation.”17  
 Hercules Mulligan and his slave Cato began their intelligence mission in 1776. Hercules 
Mulligan was a tailor and ran a successful shop in New York. He opened his shop in 1774 with 
the city on the brink of war. This clothing shop went on to house one of the more successful 
espionage operations of the war. Mulligan served the British in his shop; however, he bore the 
Crown no love and affection. He was a member of the Sons of Liberty and attacked the British 
through literature as a member of the Committees of Correspondence and Observation. Mulligan 
met with many distinguished individuals prior to the war, including Alexander Hamilton, the 
future Aide-de-Camp of Washington. Mulligan stayed in New York after its fall to the British 
and this made him a perfect candidate to gather intelligence for the Continental Army. On 
Hamilton’s recommendation, Washington began to use Mulligan for espionage purposes. 
Mulligan utilized his slave Cato in his espionage operations, and they created an effective system 
for gathering intelligence. As the British officers in New York came to Mulligan’s shop for their 
                                               
16 “Spy Executed.” New-York Gazette: and the Weekly Mercury, June 9, 1777. Founders Online. 
17 “From George Washington to John Hancock, June 13-15, 1777,” Founders Online, National 
Archives. 
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clothing needs, Mulligan took detailed notes and accounts from the officers. He used the times 
they needed their uniforms back as a frame of reference for troop movements.18 Cato was then 
dispatched to Washington’s camp in New Jersey carrying the information for the commander in 
chief. While Mulligan was ultimately successful throughout the war, his operation was small and 
dangerous. He worked with the Culper Ring towards the end of the war, as he could no longer 
transfer intelligence to Washington safely on his own. Woodhull wrote about an “acquaintance 
of Hamilton,” that passed along information from New York.19 His involvement in espionage 
was instrumental in the successful transfer of information out of New York and into the hands of 
General Washington. This being said, the necessity of an actual ring and a support system proved 
vital to the espionage efforts during the war. 
 Other notable spies during the early years of the Revolution included figures such as John 
Honeyman, Enoch Crosby, John Clark, and Lydia Darragh. John Honeyman found success in 
Trenton, New Jersey during the Christmas season of 1776. Honeyman served Washington as a 
double agent. He played the role of a butcher and was passed off as a Tory helping the Hessians 
around Trenton. He had free rein to roam the area to provide meat and supplies for those loyal to 
the Crown and even fed false information to them. Leading up to Christmas of 1776, Honeyman 
was “captured” by Washington and met with him to report on the status of the Hessian troops 
guarding Trenton. He “escaped” back to Trenton and told the Hessian commander of the bad 
shape the Continental Army was in. With this reassurance, the Hessians proceeded with their 
                                               
18 Rose. Washington’s Spies. Page 224-225. 
19 Abraham Woodhull to Benjamin Tallmadge, August 12, 1779. George Washington Papers at 
the Library of Congress, 1741-1799: Series 4. General Correspondence. 1697-1799, Image 965, 
966, 967, 968. 
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Christmas plans and opened the door for one of the most memorable American victories of the 
war. George Washington was able to defeat the unsuspecting Hessian soldiers at Trenton and 
claimed a pivotal victory in the war. This victory over the German mercenaries boosted 
Continental morale, helped increase reenlistment, and proved that Washington’s Army was able 
to hold their own against European soldiers.20  
Enoch Crosby was an individual who happened upon espionage by chance. In 1776, 
Crosby was en route to White Plains to join the Continentals. He was mistaken for a British Tory 
by loyalists in the area and was invited to join their meeting. Crosby gathered information on the 
British loyalists and made an excuse to leave. He then traveled to the Continental camp and 
reported what he learned. John Jay ordered men to arrest the Tories, as he was a member of the 
local Committee of Safety at the time and had the power to give such an order.21 Thus began 
Crosby’s career as an espionage agent. He used the same tactic multiple times: he infiltrated the 
British circles in the areas surrounding Lake Champlain, allowed himself to be captured by the 
Continental Army, passed along information on the British to the Continentals, and escaped from 
his captors back into the arms of the British.22  
John Clark and Lydia Darragh both served the rebellion in Philadelphia. John Clark came 
the closest to providing Washington with an actual organized espionage unit. He was not one 
singular man carrying out the task of espionage by himself. Clark organized couriers and 
operatives throughout Philadelphia, however, due to complications from a shoulder injury Clark 
                                               
20 Falkner, Leonard. “A Spy for Washington.” American Heritage 8, no. 5 (August 1957).  
21 Miller, Harry Edward. The Spy on Neutral Ground. The New England Magazine, 1898. Page 
313-314. 
22 Barnum, H.L. The Spy Unmasked; The Memoirs of Enoch Crosby. 1828. Library of Congress. 
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received during the war, the post was retired within a year. He began his espionage service for 
Washington in the early months of 1777. Overseen by Benjamin Tallmadge, Clark started his spy 
career serving Washington in Long Island. Not much is known of Clark’s time in Long Island, as 
he was very secretive about his expedition. His service in Philadelphia came in the latter half of 
1777.23 Lydia Darragh was a woman living in Philadelphia during the British occupation. She 
was allowed to remain in her home, provided she keep a room for the British to use for meetings. 
Listening in on a meeting detailing an attack on the Continental Army, she made plans to transfer 
the information to Washington. Darragh was able to pass along the information and aid 
Washington’s army.24  
 Espionage between 1775 and 1777 faced a lot of challenges. The spies involved 
constantly lived in a state of danger. Oftentimes, these spies experienced failure and defeat, 
which could mean death. With the exception of John Clark, the majority of agents between these 
years faced their challenges alone. Prior to 1778, intelligence was mainly processed by singular 
operatives with no support or organization. The entire art of espionage would change with the 
formation of the Culper Ring in New York. Washington eventually found success through this 
operation and it would go on to change the course of the war. 
  
                                               
23 Rose. Washington’s Spies. Page 47-60. 
24 Boudinot, Elias. Journal or Historical Recollections of American Events During the 
Revolutionary War. Library of Congress, 1894. Page 50.  
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The Culper Ring Background Information 
 The purpose of this section is to explore the background and history that specifically led 
to the formation of the Culper Ring. This section examines the members of the ring, their 
introduction to the ring, and how they formed a cohesive espionage unit.  
 By 1778, it was clear that single espionage units were dangerous and unstable. The 
already unpredictable nature of espionage proved fatal to many of these small organizations. 
Washington knew that something more than just singular espionage agents was needed, as these 
small operations would only result in the loss of more men, something the Continentals could not 
afford. Washington desperately needed to get intelligence from New York, and he needed a 
reliable and safe way to do it.  
 General Washington appointed Benjamin Tallmadge as the Director of Military 
Intelligence in 1778. Benjamin Tallmadge grew up in Setauket, New York, a place that would be 
vital to American espionage. He attended Yale along with Nathan Hale, where the two became 
close friends.25 Following his time at Yale, Tallmadge went on to become a school teacher. After 
the rebellious events of 1775, Tallmadge began to seriously contemplate joining in the war 
effort. He did so in 1776 when offered the position of lieutenant. Tallmadge rose to the rank of 
captain quickly, gaining command of the 2nd Regiment of Light Dragoons.26 By 1777, 
Tallmadge gained the status of major and the attention of his superiors. Tallmadge’s cunning, 
                                               
25 Stiles, Ezra. Diploma from Yale University. 1770. Archived Letters, Fraunces Tavern 
Museum.  
26 Hancock, John. Commission of Benjamin Tallmadge. December 14, 1776. Archived Letters, 
Fraunces Tavern Museum. 
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determination, and loyalty earned him a spot at Washington’s table. By the end of 1778, 
Tallmadge was appointed as the new Director of Military Intelligence as Charles Scott, the man 
who held the position prior to Tallmadge, lost interest and had other matters to tend to.27  
Intelligence up to this point in the war was often inaccurate and dangerous to come by. 
The use of smaller espionage units proved fatal on multiple occasions. Washington and 
Tallmadge needed a more elaborate and delicate form of espionage. The two used Tallmadge’s 
past and connections to form an espionage ring, an organization with multiple operatives serving 
in different locations and engaging in different tasks. Washington and Tallmadge began forming 
one of the most successful spy rings in American History. Tallmadge assembled the Culper Ring, 
an organization stationed in Setauket and New York City. Washington oversaw the Ring and 
acted as the spymaster, while Tallmadge became the main handler for the Ring. He took the 
name John Bolton and received reports from his contacts throughout the war. Tallmadge’s 
dedication to his spies was important. He was their only point of contact and no one else aside 
from Washington knew the identities of the ring. Washington wrote to Tallmadge on November 
20, 1778, “You will be pleased to observe the strictest silence with respect to C— as you are to 
be the only person entrusted with the knowledge or conveyance of his Letters.”28 This dedication 
and devotion held the Ring together, even in the face of danger.29 
 The Culper Ring consisted of key members residing in New York during the British 
occupation. One of the first members of the ring was Caleb Brewster. The spark that lit the fire 
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that was the Culper Ring, Brewster began his service with the Continental Army long before the 
Culper Ring came to fruition. Brewster was born and raised in Setauket. He became a Nantucket 
whaler and lived his early life on the sea. He served on both whale and merchant ships prior to 
his service in the war. Brewster joined the Suffolk County Minute Men and started serving as 
soon as the war began. His early efforts in the war revolved around the transportation of patriot 
refugees escaping British-occupied New York. Brewster joined the Continental Army in 1776 as 
a lieutenant and continued to serve the patriot cause on the water. On August 7, 1778, Brewster 
wrote a letter to George Washington, offering his services in intelligence. Washington replied 
with very specific instructions on how to go about espionage. He wrote, “do not spare any 
reasonable expense to come at early and true information; always recollecting, and bearing in 
mind, that vague and uncertain account of things … is more disturbing and dangerous than 
receiving none at all.”30 Washington’s acceptance of Brewster and the instruction he provided on 
espionage sparked one of the most successful spy operations of the war. He began his espionage 
missions alone, working along the coast to report any troop movements or ship movements in 
New York. He initially reported directly to Charles Scott, the man Washington had originally 
charged with heading up the intelligence operation, although the work was passed on to 
Tallmadge when he took over for Scott. The Culper Ring utilized Brewster’s mastery of the 
waters and his willingness to cross enemy lines to help carry intelligence. Brewster was vital in 
the transportation of intelligence from the ring in New York to Tallmadge in Connecticut.  
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 Abraham Woodhull was one of the most important figures of the operation and 
eventually took the codename Samuel Culper Senior. Residing in the city of Setauket on Long 
Island, Woodhull was pivotal in the success of the ring. Woodhull was born in October of 1750 
to Judge Richard and Mary Woodhull. He also bore a relation to the New York militia Brigadier 
General Nathaniel Woodhull, whose death at the hands of the British only helped push Woodhull 
into the war. Woodhull was first brought to Washington’s eye when Tallmadge reported him as a 
potential contact for Caleb Brewster. Woodhull had been detained in Connecticut due to his 
involvement with illegal trading. As a farmer, Woodhull had access to certain plants and foods as 
well as livestock and animals that proved valuable on the black market. Tallmadge met with 
Woodhull before the latter was released from his detainment. The two discussed the possibility 
of Woodhull joining Brewster in gathering intelligence in New York. Washington was delighted 
with the new prospect Tallmadge found and helped developed code names for both Tallmadge 
and Woodhull. While Tallmadge was given the name John Bolton, Abraham Woodhull took the 
alias of Samuel Culper. The name Samuel Culper was carefully crafted by George Washington, 
Charles Scott, and Benjamin Tallmadge. This name referenced Culpepper County; the area 
Washington surveyed in his youth. The initials SC were the inverse of Charles Scott’s initials, 
CS. The name Samuel was a direct reference to Tallmadge’s younger brother. Thus, Samuel 
Culper and the Culper Ring were born.31 Woodhull lived in Setauket and used this town as his 
primary base and location. In the earlier parts of the operation, there was no operative inside of 
Manhattan, a task which fell to Woodhull. He constantly had to make the dangerous journey 
from Setauket to the city and oftentimes this resulted in slow moving information. Abraham 
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Woodhull eventually brought in help in the form of Robert Townsend, a merchant who resided 
within New York City. This allowed Woodhull to remain home in Setauket to conduct his spy 
business.32  
 Woodhull received help and support from Amos and Mary Underhill, the latter being his 
married sister, as they resided in Manhattan. The fact that Amos and Mary lived in the city gave 
Woodhull reason to visit. They provided him shelter through the boarding house they owned; 
however, they were not there to provide their own intelligence. They were involved solely to 
provide Woodhull with a place to stay and keep him safe during his time in the city. Austin Roe 
and Jonas Hawkins acted as couriers for the espionage ring. They made the 55-mile journey from 
Manhattan to Setauket to pass along information collected in the city to the contacts in Setauket.  
At the start of the organization, Woodhull gathered intelligence in the city while the couriers 
brought this information to Brewster, who was waiting in Setauket. This allowed Woodhull to 
spend more time gathering intelligence in the city and avoid having to constantly make the 
journey to Setauket every time he received new information. After the introduction of Townsend 
to the Ring, Woodhull was able to remain in Setauket to collect information brought by the 
couriers.33 (However, in September of 1779, Hawkins left the Culper Ring and left much of the 
courier duty to Roe.34)  While Roe, Hawkins, and the Underhills were reliable assets to 
Woodhull, it was still incredibly dangerous for him. Woodhull constantly faced the stress of 
being discovered. On his way to New York in the spring of 1779, Woodhull was mugged by 
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local privateers. Later that year, a privateer prisoner of the British named John Wolsey gave his 
captors information on Woodhull. While Woodhull was not captured by the British, he had to 
have a loyalist friend vouch for him to clear his name of any Continental connections.35 As no 
permanent agent in New York City had yet been procured and his life was constantly being 
threatened, Woodhull was ready to get out of the espionage game. In 1779, Woodhull wrote to 
Tallmadge on his fear of traveling to New York and wanting out of the Ring. His only condition 
for staying was finding someone else to gather intelligence in Manhattan.36 
 While Woodhull was scared and wanted out, he would remain in Setauket and continue 
his espionage work for Washington, as long as someone else gathered intelligence in Manhattan. 
In the letter Woodhull wrote to Tallmadge, he said,  
I dare say you will be filled with wonder and surprise, that I have had the good 
fortune to escape confinement. And I am sorry to inform you that it hath rendered 
me almost unserviceable to you … I am now a suspected person I cannot frequent 
their camp as heretofore, I [propose] quitting 10 (New York) and residing at 20 
(Setauket). I shall endeavor to establish a confidential friend to step into my place 
if agreeable.37 
 
His letter expresses his fear and desire to get out of espionage, but it also reveals his dedication 
to Washington and the patriot effort. On June 8, 1779, Woodhull met with his New York 
replacement on what he hoped would be his last trip to New York City. His trip was successful 
and as of June 1779, Washington officially had an agent within New York City. Woodhull 
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relayed this information to Tallmadge in a letter on June 20, 1779.38 Washington was relieved 
and happy with the outcome. He sent Woodhull money to cover what was lost in his mugging 
and to reassure his agent of his support.39 
 Robert Townsend was the missing piece of the Culper Ring puzzle. He was the son of 
Samuel Townsend and haled from Oyster Bay. Born November 25, 1753, Robert Townsend was 
raised in an interesting home dynamic. His father was Quaker by birthright, although he never 
entirely fit in with the Quaker way of life, while his mother was Episcopalian. Robert Townsend 
did little to aid his father’s “shenanigans” and altogether tried to avoid the rampant politics of the 
area.40 Instead, he focused on developing his professional career as a merchant in New York 
City. He worked at mercantile House of Templeton and Stewart in his teen years and eventually 
opened his own business in 1773. While he had some initial involvement with the patriot forces 
at the start of the war, Townsend quickly washed his hands of any official dealings with the 
Continental Army and began catering to the British needs in New York. He came to work closely 
with James Rivington, a local journalist and respected loyalist businessman. Townsend even 
owned a share of Rivington’s coffeehouse, a place that was favorited by many of the British 
officers in New York City. He took lodging with Woodhull’s brother-in-law, Amos Underhill, 
who also came from a Quaker family in Oyster Bay. Townsend, a secret patriot such as 
Woodhull, resided fulltime in the city. Woodhull spent time getting to know Townsend and his 
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loyalties while staying with the Underhills. While Townsend played the part of British loyalist, 
he had a passion for patriotism. In one of his surviving letters, he explains that often times 
actions and beliefs tend to be two different things. He uses this to justify his espionage activities. 
“The gravest persons betray an inward esteem for a statesman, who has been the contriver of a 
very notable piece of political management, at the same time they are … obliged outwardly to 
censure the immorality of the action.”41 Townsend had a tough time in New York; he faced 
economic hardship, an unhappy working relationship with Henry Oakham (a former partner of 
Townsend), and business struggles due to the war. Despite these hardships, he still supported the 
Patriot cause and became a vital part of the Culper Ring.42 Townsend considered dropping his 
job to focus on providing intelligence full time, however, Washington thought it better for him to 
remain in his employment. Washington sent a letter to Tallmadge explaining why he thought this 
was not a great idea. “It is not my opinion that Culper Junr. should be advised to give up his 
present employment. I would imagine that with a little industry he will be able to carry on his 
intelligence with greater security to himself, and greater advantages to us — under cover of his 
usual business, than if he were to dedicate himself wholly to the giving of information.”43 The 
fact that Townsend was willing to quit his job and dedicate himself full time to the Patriot cause 
reflects how dedicated he, along with the rest of the Ring, was to the espionage effort.  
 The Culper Ring had other important agents as well. Anna Strong, born April 14, 1740, 
was one such member. She was married to Selah Strong and supported his patriotic sentiments in 
                                               
41 Personal notes by Robert Townsend, in the Townsend Family Papers, Raynam Hall Museum 
on loan from East Hampton Library. 
42 Rose. Washington’s Spies. Page 125-164. 
43 George Washington to Benjamin Tallmadge. September 24, 1779. Stony Brook University 
Library. 
  23 
the beginning of the war. Following his departure to Connecticut, she remained as the sole 
caretaker of their property in Setauket. She was neighbors with Abraham Woodhull and helped 
in his espionage activities. Her status and gender helped disguise her espionage activity. She was 
essential in signaling the arrival of Caleb Brewster to Woodhull. The system of signaling they 
used was not seen as out of place for a woman tending to the duties of her household.44 While 
Hercules Mulligan and Cato had their own operation, they eventually came to work with the 
Culper Ring as well. Following the arrest and release of Mulligan from British custody, he 
passed along information to Townsend, as opposed to sending it directly to Washington. This 
alleviated the suspicion from him and allowed him to continue gathering intelligence. Other 
people and informants were used by the Ring. The identity of Agent 355, while unknown, 
gathers speculation that another female was involved and vital to the Ring’s success. Whether or 
not Agent 355 existed, it is clear that the Culper Ring utilized people that sat outside of the 
cultural norm of society. The Ring constantly used the boundaries of cultural norms, pushed 
class boundaries, and evaded societal expectations in order to create a successful espionage 
operation. This use and push of boundaries is what made the Ring as successful as it was. The 
Ring exploited individuals that sat outside of those that had power and standing in British and 
American society.45  
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Honor and Espionage 
  The purpose of this section is to look at how both European and American 
societies viewed espionage in terms of honor. Honor played a large part in society at this time 
and things like guerrilla warfare, espionage, or anything sneaky, were held in low regard. This 
concept is important to note as those engaged in espionage literally risked everything, even their 
honor, to fight for something they believed in.  
 Merriam-Webster defines honor as “a keen sense of ethical conduct.”46 Honor was 
incredibly important during the 1700s. Historically, honor came to represent one’s “manliness” 
or a person’s standing in society. If one were to violate their honor, they would lose their 
standing and all respect due to them. Honor and integrity played key roles in life during the 
eighteenth century. Both of these words represent someone good and upstanding. This person 
would never do anything to violate the laws or fair play of society. Because society looked at 
warfare in a certain way, honor and war went hand in hand. There was an honorable or 
upstanding way to fight. There were rules that needed to be followed, and if violated, a person 
would lose their honor and standing. The American Revolution was a war centered on honor. 
Throughout the war, honor, and the traditional form of warfare that the British were used to, 
were overlooked at times. Continental tactics involved guerrilla warfare and espionage, as 
opposed to the traditional formed lines firing back and forth at each other that the British had 
practiced for so long. Even though the new country was based on honor, leaders of the revolution 
found it necessary to bend the rules at times. The Founding Fathers declared, “and for the 
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support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we 
mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.”47 Upholding 
honor was important to the foundation of the United States; however, violating this honor was a 
necessity in order to beat the giant this new country found itself facing. Craig Bruce Smith 
examines the formation of honor as an American ideal. He writes, “One’s honor and virtue 
depended on right or proper conduct. How that was judged was a matter of each person’s own 
ethical and cultural understandings.”48 
 To better understand the role honor played in British and American society, it is 
imperative to first examine Great Britain’s history in terms of honor. The Code of Chivalry 
played an important part in the foundation of how Great Britain came to look at honor in the 
eighteenth century. Chivalry, as defined by Edgar Prestage, was “the moral and social law and 
custom of the noble and gentle class in Western Europe during the later Middle Ages, and the 
results of that law and custom in action.”49 Edgar goes on to explain that this code had three 
principle factors: war, religion, and the love of ladies.50 This code laid the groundwork for the 
rules and regulations that warfare came to have. Prior to the establishment of Chivalry, there was 
little honor on the battlefield. Death and destruction reigned supreme with little consequence and 
no order. The eventual order came with the introduction of Chivalry in the late 1100s/early 
1200s. Chivalry reached its height between 1250 and 1350. Chivalry, and the honor that went 
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along with it, became important themes in Medieval life.51 This gave way to a more modern 
sense of honor that transformed rules of warfare the British, as well as the rest of Europe, came 
to fight and die by.  
 While today, people view Chivalry as a way to treat women, it was originally created as a 
way to control the violence and destruction of Knights during the Middle Ages. An epic poem 
written in the late 1000s entitled The Song of Roland outlines what Chivalry looked like in the 
Middle Ages. The Chivalric Code was based highly on honor, calling for the knights to live their 
lives on and off the battlefield with integrity. Listed among the items on the Code of Chivalry 
found in the poem is “to live by honor and glory.”52 Other things such as “to guard the honor of 
fellow knights” and “to avoid unfairness, meanness, and deceit” are also listed among the rules 
Knights were supposed to follow.53 Prestage describes Chivalry as “an imperfect discipline, but 
it was a discipline, and one fit for the times.”54 Chivalry transformed the scope of Medieval life. 
It gave a sense of morality and honor to the people of the Medieval period. This morality and 
honor became cemented in their way of life and would persist well into the modern age. Because 
these two characteristics were highly sought after during the Middle Ages, anything that directly 
violated those characteristics were looked down upon. The sneaky and deceitful nature of 
espionage had no place in a society so enraptured by honor and virtue.  
 By the eighteenth century, changes had occurred that had a profound effect on honor on 
the battlefield. Advances in technology allowed the widespread use of guns to transform the 
                                               
51 Ibid. Page 17.  
52 Goldin, Frederick. The Song of Roland. New York: Norton, 1978. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Prestage. Chivalry. Page 28. 
  27 
battlefield. While the technology changed, the forces that fought during this period did not. They 
still lined up in an honorable manner and shot at each other in lines. They were trying to uphold 
morals and ideals from an old and dying style of warfare. In this period, it was expected that 
participants in a battle would give the other side fair warning before an attack began. These 
battles were very formulated and regulated. Deceitful attacks and tactics were frowned upon. The 
old-world rules of the early modern warfare period quickly became outdated. Nonetheless, they 
were the rules of the day and had to be obeyed. These rules were so centered on publicly 
upholding integrity that anything sneaky was seen as disrespectful.55 
 Espionage by its very nature is dishonest. It is secretive, cunning, and sneaky. These 
characteristics violated the code and morals that eighteenth century warfare held so dear. 
However, the need for intelligence was imperative. While public opinion of espionage was not 
very high, intelligence networks began exploding across Europe during this period. Jeremy 
Black, in British Diplomats and Diplomacy, 1688-1800, outlines the activities of British 
diplomats stationed in different capitals and their aid to intelligence. Even this form of 
intelligence beheld more honor than the outright espionage used in the American Revolution.56 
Those involved in these early British intelligence efforts were official diplomats and 
representatives of the Crown. While they did partake in procuring intelligence covertly, they 
were more focused on the nature of their diplomatic missions and lives. Throughout the history 
of England, clandestine and covert espionage activities were only truly utilized in times of 
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extreme crisis. There was no permanent espionage organization, as people did not see any honor 
behind it.57 
 Honor was an important part of everyday life in Great Britain. After founding the 
colonies, this honor was passed over into America, as both Great Britain and her colonies were 
founded on the ideals of honor and integrity. American life adhered closely to honor and virtue. 
Craig Bruce Smith describes how Americans, typically white males, looked at honor at the 
country’s birth. “From America’s infancy, honor and virtue had been stereotypically the domain 
of white males. From the elites to the middling class, these ideals were often the bar to which all 
men were held. They governed their beliefs, their careers, their social interactions - their entire 
lives.”58 While upholding honor was important to retain good standing in both British and 
American societies, both parties were okay with putting people in the position of spies for their 
success. As the colonies became more distant and less dependent on Great Britain, they seemed 
to shift their way of looking at things. Exposed to an entirely new world, the colonists had to 
figure out a new set of rules to play by. Americans came to value their freedom more than the 
old-world rules they had been founded on. While they still valued honor and integrity, they were 
able to partake in activities such as espionage and guerrilla warfare with more ease than their 
British enemies. Leaders like George Washington realized that if America was going to survive, 
they had to make up their own rules. While Washington was a man dedicated to honor, he was 
able to utilize espionage as it was essential to the success of the war. Washington spoke on the 
absolute necessity of standing against the British, no matter the cost, in a general order from July 
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2, 1776. “We have therefore to resolve to conquer or die: Our own Country’s Honor, all call 
upon us for a vigorous and manly exertion, and if we now shamefully fail, we shall become 
infamous to the whole world.”59 His focus on intelligence paid off. He became an excellent 
spymaster during the war.  
The British turned to the world of espionage in order to keep up with Washington and his 
new set of rules.  Leaders like Henry Clinton were the product of an age that frowned upon 
covert espionage operations. Historian Alexander Rose describes this as “a conventional military 
establishment, where spies were regarded with distaste.”60 Major John André became one of the 
leading British espionage agents in the War for Independence. He oversaw the intelligence effort 
in the New World and came head to head with the Culper Ring during the war.61  
Washington understood that espionage was not the most glamorous thing a person could 
undertake. His agents knew that becoming spies came with the possibility of dishonorable 
actions. However, these men knew that they were fighting for something much bigger than 
themselves and therefore took the risk of losing that standing among their peers. Nathan Hale 
understood the risk associated with engaging in espionage. In a biography written by Henry 
Phillips Johnson, Hale is quoted as saying “I am not influenced by the expectation of promotion 
or pecuniary reward; I wish to be useful, and every kind of service, necessary to the public good, 
becomes honorable by being necessary. If the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar 
services claims to perform that service are imperious.”62 While honor was important to society in 
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the eighteenth century and espionage was not seen as something honorable, this did not stop both 
parties from engaging in espionage during the American Revolution. 
  
  31 
Social Norms and Espionage 
This section explores the structure of British, and later American, society.  It explores 
cultural norms that the Culper Ring were able to use to their advantage. In a letter to her husband 
John on March 31,1776, Abigale Adams wrote, “That your sex are naturally tyrannical is a truth 
so thoroughly established as to admit of no dispute”63 British and American men held complete 
and total dominance over not only the women, but the slaves of their societies. This dominance 
gave them a blind eye that allowed women and slaves to engage in acts of espionage.  
 In the eighteenth century, life in England was distinctly divided by wealth and status. 
According to a report by Joseph Massie, an English economist, the aristocracy sat at the top of 
the socio-economic chain. Gentlemen, merchants, manufacturers, and tradesman sat below them 
earning significantly less. The lower income bracket held the most members. Those earning 
below 200 pounds annually far outnumbered the aristocracy. The most common of these low 
wage earners were laborers and seamen. This low-income bracket made up the traditional 
workforce in England.64 
There was also some distinction between women and men. Men were in control during 
this period. They had jurisdiction over the affairs of state while women were responsible for 
affairs of the home. The common law idea of coverture, or the absorption “of a married woman’s 
legal and financial identity under that of her husband,” gave men superiority over women.65  
At common law, the husband and father had nearly absolute authority over its 
wife and children, including the right to administer physical correction. A wife 
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was unable to make contracts or to own property unless she negotiated a 
premarital contract, and she could not make gifts or write a will without her 
mate’s consent. She owed her husband total obedience, and he could do what he 
wished with any property she bought unencumbered to the marriage or that they 
accumulated together. He also controlled the management and took the profits of 
any property in which she had a life interest, and he could appropriate any wages 
she might earn.66  
 
Men had complete dominance over their wives during this period.  Because of this dominance, 
woman held different status than men did.   
  English common law granted women two different statuses. Feme sole referred to single 
women while feme covert referred to married women. These positions were long established in 
British society and common law. Common law is described by Patrick Glenn. He wrote, “the 
concept of common law is thus preceded by the practice, and the practice is an infinitely varied 
process of adjustment of expanding laws to recalcitrant local, legal resistance, everywhere in 
Europe.”67 Women historically had few rights. They were legally submissive to first their fathers 
then their husbands. Because coverture was cemented in society through ages of practice, 
overlooking women and their lives was easy to do in the 1700s. Some colonies had laws set in 
place to allow women limited rights, although they were severely disregarded at the time. 
Women were seen as inferior to men and were treated as such.68 
Historically, many different cultures and societies throughout the world practiced 
gendered dominance. Even in matriarchal societies such as some Native American tribes, the 
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men were in charge of the public affairs while the women were in charge of the private and 
household affairs.69 Women blended into the background of everyday life while men took center 
stage. Men in England held offices, owned property, and dictated much of what occurred in 
social and political settings.70 As colonies tend to reflect the ideals and values of its mother 
country, the Thirteen Colonies held much of this in the same regard. Arthur M. Schlesinger 
writes, “The colonists unhesitatingly took for granted the concept of a graded society.”71 He 
describes the American aristocracy, or gentry, as the members of an upper middle class with no 
noble heritage. The British aristocracy consisted of a more royal background while that of 
America consisted of mercantile craftsmen and plantation owners. According to Gordon Wood, 
“The American aristocracy, such as it was, was not only weaker than its English counterpart; it 
also had a great deal of trouble maintaining both the desired classical independence and its 
freedom from the marketplace. Few members of the American gentry were able to live off the 
rent of tenants as the English landed aristocracy did.”72 The fact that the American gentry did not 
have the same status of the British aristocrats shows a growing divide between the mother 
country and its offspring. 
 The cultural normal for this period was that a white man owned land and was in charge. 
White men fought the wars, made the laws, and ran the government.  Because of this cultural 
norm, slaves and women were able to observe and report while evading punishment or notice, 
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solely because it was unexpected of them. As the population of the colonies grew and plantations 
began to boom, slavery became much more crucial to the American way of life. Slaves provided 
the needed labor force for most tasks while women typically took care of and oversaw the home 
life. Margaret Ellen Newell discusses the origins of slavery and how the colonists used them in 
her book Brethren by Nature.73Throughout eighteenth century, women and slaves were treated 
almost like nonexistent beings. Generally, they could not vote, own property, or testify in court.  
Because slaves and most women lacked political, social, and economic identity, things could be 
said or happen in front of them with almost no repercussions. Years of living in these conditions 
made women and slaves invisible to their owners and husbands.74  
 The white land-owning males who held all the power were often dependent on their 
slaves and their women. Without servants and slaves, the day-to-day operations of colonial life 
would have failed. Without women around to keep the household moving and functioning, 
offering their support and guidance, and helping cultivate future generations, the home life 
would have been abysmal. Kristin Olson discusses the role of women in the household during 
this period. “Within the normative heterosexual marriage, procreation and the raising of children 
took center stage for most women.”75. Utilizing both women and slaves, the Culper Ring, as well 
as other intelligence operations during the American Revolution, was able to sneak pertinent and 
useful information under the noses of those they were taking it from. 76 
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 One of the key members of the Culper Ring was a woman. She was able to participate in 
the Ring because rather than let her gender role limit and define her, she used it to her advantage. 
As mentioned previously, Anna Strong signaled Abraham Woodhull when Caleb Brewster was 
in town. Anna Strong was neighbors with Woodhull and shared his patriotic sentiment. She 
played the part of the good and faithful wife. She supported her husband and looked after her 
home and kids. Her husband, Selah, was a devout patriot and supporter of independence. This 
landed him in trouble with the British and he was imprisoned for a time on Jersey, a British 
prison ship. Being the good wife she was, Anna fought for her husband’s safety. She brought 
him food aboard the ship and eventually got him out on parole. After he was released, he 
traveled to Connecticut with their children, where he spent the remainder of the war. His 
departure left Anna Strong to look after their residence alone. Anna insisted on remaining in 
Setauket, under the guise of caring for her home and residence in her husband’s absence. She 
used this as a cover to hide her espionage activities.77 Strong was able to use this cover well. She 
looked after her household, tended to her chores, and did little to arouse suspicion. Yet, her 
primary goal was to signal the operatives in Setauket. Whenever Caleb Brewster arrived and was 
ready to make contact with Woodhull, Strong would signal Woodhull via the laundry. As 
laundry was an expected task for women during this period, it was not out of the ordinary that 
Strong would be hanging laundry. It was not questioned, nor was there any suspicion regarding 
it. She hung the laundry in a certain way that was visible to Woodhull. If she hung a black 
petticoat on the line, it signaled that Brewster was in town and ready to meet. Based on the 
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number of white handkerchiefs in her wash, Woodhull was able to determine the location of 
Brewster’s boat, as they corresponded to different coves where he hid his boat. Using Strong was 
brilliant. Because she was simply trying to take care of her household and look after her family, 
she was not arrested for espionage. While a woman in Setauket was suspected of espionage, 
there was no incriminating evidence that pointed to Strong as the culprit. She simply went about 
her daily routines and did nothing out of the ordinary for a woman at this time. These actions 
gave her the perfect cover for her work with the Culper Ring.78 There was another woman that 
potentially worked with the Culper Ring. While it is unknown exactly who the letter refers to, 
Abraham Woodhull explains that he thought “by the assistance of a lady of [his] acquaintance, 
shall [they] be able to outwit them all.”79 Woodhull and the rest of the Ring knew that women 
could more easily pass through the British defenses.  Women were also used outside of the 
Culper Ring. Lydia Darragh, a woman residing in Philadelphia during the war, is an example of 
how women were able to participate in the war effort without being suspected. Her story, 
discussed in the earlier section on espionage prior to the Culper Ring, explains how she used her 
status as a woman to get away with covert acts. 
 The British intelligence movement also utilized women. Peggy Shippen, the wife of 
Benedict Arnold, was instrumental in his defection, and was even compensated by the British 
government. Interestingly enough, she was paid more for her involvement than Arnold was. 
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Arnold was given a one-time payment of 6,350 pounds for his espionage activities while she was 
paid 1,000 pounds a year for life. She was also given money for her children and their 
upbringing.80 The British received information from a woman named Ann Bates. She infiltrated 
Continental camps and reported her findings back to the British. A letter from the British says, “a 
woman who Craig has trusted often came to town last night … I will return whenever she may 
have learned anything that shall be desired to be known.”81 A deposition from the British 
describes one Miss Jenny, a woman that infiltrated French and American camps to secure 
intelligence reports.82 While the British were hesitant to fall into the depths of espionage, they 
were willing to embrace support where they could find it. Therefore, women were essential to 
both American and British espionage. 
  Slaves sat outside of the “cultural norm” at this time and were regarded as lower class, 
almost nonexistent beings. Slaves during the war were just another feature of the property. They 
were there to do the bidding of their masters, nothing more. Because slaves were seen as 
property and practically invisible in society, they made the perfect eyes and ears for spies. They 
were present for conversations that others were not privy to. Slaves were able to blend into the 
background and gather information easily. In New York, Hercules Mulligan and his slave Cato 
proved invaluable to the war effort. As a tailor to the British officers in New York, Hercules 
Mulligan was able to gather information on British troop movements. He used his slave, Cato, to 
transport that information to the Continental Army. As a slave, Cato was able to travel through 
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enemy lines to transport the information gathered by Mulligan. Eventually, Mulligan and Cato 
came to work with the Culper Ring, helping to supply information on New York to Washington. 
The effectiveness of this was due in part to Cato being overlooked by the British. He was often-
times able to slip through, completely unsuspected. The British initially did not think Cato was 
capable of espionage activities. As the slave to a man the British were familiar with, the British 
had no reason to suspect him. However, after Mulligan was eventually arrested on suspicion of 
espionage, the pair came under surveillance from the British.83 
Another spy that owed his success to the color of his skin was James Armistead. 
Armistead was an African-American slave who worked under William Armistead, a Virginia 
patriot. He was selected to serve Marquis de Lafayette as a spy in 1781. He posed as a runaway 
slave and began working for Benedict Arnold and General Cornwallis. They tasked him with 
spying on the Continental forces. Because he was assigned to spy on the Continentals, he was 
easily able to relay information on the British to Lafayette. Armistead was able to blend in to the 
background of life and walk such a fine line, he was able to effectively gather and report on 
intelligence. He worked as a double agent, “spying” for the British while reporting information 
on their movements to Lafayette.84 He later petitioned for his freedom, and both Lafayette and 
William Armistead came to his aid. In a letter brought to the general assembly, Armistead’s 
actions during the war were outlined. “That during the time of his serving the Marquiss he often 
at the peril of his life found means to frequent the British Camp, by which means he kept open a 
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channel of the most useful communications to the army of the state: That at different times your 
petitioner conveyed inclosures, from the Marquiss into the enemies lines, of the most secret & 
important kind; the possession of which if discovered on him would have most certainly 
endangered the life of your petitioner: That he undertook & performed all commands with 
chearfulness & fidelity, in opposition to the persuasion & example of many thousands of his 
unfortunate condition.”85 
 While women and slaves were able to use their position to their advantage, this did not 
mean that they were completely above suspicion. While Strong was never arrested, there was a 
woman suspected of espionage in Setauket fitting her description.86 Her work was done low key, 
however, it still proved to be a dangerous game, even as a woman. Cato was captured and beaten 
once following a trip to Washington’s camp. He remained under suspicion for the remainder of 
the war, one of the leading reasons Mulligan and Cato began working with the Culper Ring.87 
Women and slaves involved in espionage were in just as much danger as their white male 
counterparts.  
 Both women and slaves were vital to life in the eighteenth century. However, cultural 
traditions in England, and later America, dictated the status in which these people were treated. 
Men disregarded both their wives and their slaves, as historically they had little to no standing in 
society. This poor standing allowed women and slaves to get away with much more than the 
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white males in charge. Invisible to the people making the rules, women and slaves were excellent 
candidates for espionage.  
  
  41 
Methods Used by the Culper Ring 
 The Culper Ring used a variety of techniques to successfully smuggle intelligence under 
the noses of the British. The spies of the eighteenth century unlocked a whole new arsenal of spy 
techniques to utilize. This section looks at the different methods and techniques used by 
espionage agents in the eighteenth century, with specific examples from the Culper Ring. The 
Culper Ring made magnificent strides and utilized different techniques to successfully launch an 
intelligence assault on the British.  
 The most important thing used by the Culper Ring was their code book. The code used by 
the Ring allowed them to send letters and updates to each other while maintaining their secrecy. 
Codes were nothing new, intelligence networks and diplomats had been using them for years. An 
early original code used during the Revolution was based off the Ave Maria code created some 
two hundred years earlier by a priest.88 However, the Culper Ring needed a more simplified 
code, as these codes could become long and confusing. 
 The code created by Tallmadge for the Culper Ring consisted of a list of numbers that 
held specific meanings. For example, the number 10 was code for “absent” while the number 20 
meant “affair.” In total, there were seven hundred and sixty-three numbers that represented 
words, names, or places the Culper Ring found vital to their operation. The code was simple, as 
Tallmadge did not have the time or means to train all of the agents involved in something more 
complex. Tallmadge arranged his code alphabetically. Words that started with “A” came first in 
the code. These words had numbers 1-47. Words that started with Z (there was only one - zeal) 
came at the end of the code. Zeal was assigned number 710. Numbers 711-726 represented 
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specific people the Ring discussed. For example, number 711 was code for Washington, while 
725 was code for Caleb Brewster. Numbers 727-763 represented specific places and locations 
the Ring needed to discuss. 763 was code for “headquarters” and 729 was code for “Setauket.” 
For things not listed in the code, Tallmadge created a jumbled alphabet and numeric system. For 
example, both “a” and “1” were represented by “e” and “b” and “2” were represented by “f.” 
This was an easy way to include numbers and letters not assigned a numeric value in the code. 
There is a discrepancy here, as Woodhull used 10 to represent New York and 20 to represent 
Setauket. This was an early code consisting of only four numbers. These numbers were replaced 
by Tallmadge’s full code dictionary in July of 1779.89 
 Another technique utilized by the ring was invisible ink. The invisible ink was developed 
by James Jay, brother to John Jay - a leading member in Congress as well as a diplomat and the 
eventual first attorney general. James was a chemist by hobby and doctor by trade, thus he had 
the perfect cover to experiment with different solutions. He created the invisible ink in 1775, a 
feat that gave him the ability to send word to his brother about what the British were up to. It was 
called “sympathetic” ink, the words written in the agent only appeared when the reagent was 
applied. John Jay wrote to Washington in November of 1778 about the use of invisible ink and 
how it could be utilized. “This will be delivered by my Brother, who will communicate & 
explain to your Excellency a mode of Correspondence, which may be of use, provided proper 
agents can be obtained.”90 This invisible ink finally made its way into the hands of the Culper 
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Ring the following year. Woodhull was overjoyed when he received the invisible ink, and was 
ready to use “a vial for a purpose that gives me great satisfaction” for his letters.91 While the 
introduction of the invisible ink proved an exciting new addition to the Culper Ring’s arsenal, the 
Ring oftentimes found the ink in short supply. James Jay created the ink and kept the recipe to 
himself. The letters written using this ink are too old to run tests on; however, according to 
Alexander Rose, the invisible ink more than likely consisted of gallic acid and gum Arabic. The 
reagent more than likely consisted of ferrous Sulphur and distilled water.92 The invisible ink was 
so vital because of the way it was made. Typical invisible inks during this period could be 
revealed by heat. The ink created by Jay could only be revealed by applying the reagent, a factor 
that allowed the Ring to completely hide their secrets from British eyes. The Ring did what they 
could to preserve the ink, even when they received a heftier supply of it. Because of the shortage 
they faced, they were careful to use it even when they had a larger supply, for fear they would 
again find themselves short of the ink. The invisible ink proved vital to the Ring, however, the 
dread of losing the ink caused the Ring’s progress to slow. Tallmadge dispersed a supply of the 
ink to at least Woodhull, if not other members of the Ring such as Townsend, however, they 
used it very sparingly. A letter from Washington in November of 1779 describes how limited the 
supply of ink was. He wrote, “I send you a part of the very small quantity of the stain, which I 
have left, to be forwarded to C---- jun., as he says he is in want of it. He should be directed to use 
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it with the utmost frugality.”93 Washington claimed that the Ring could have been producing way 
more intelligence than they were with the invisible ink, and he stated that “what I have sent for 
him at different times would have wrote fifty times what I have read from him.”94 While it 
caused some tension for Washington, the invisible ink created by Jay did wonders for the Culper 
Ring.   
 The way the Culper Ring functioned was perhaps its greatest strength. The Ring became 
a well-oiled machine, with each member doing their part to aid in the safe passing of 
intelligence. In a letter to Tallmadge on October 9, 1779, Washington was adamant about having 
a trusted person carry the Ring’s letters. “Should a certain operation take place, it will be 
necessary to establish a very regular communication with Long Island. These things are better 
settled personally than by letter, I shall therefore be glad to see you at Head Quarters. After 
leaving some person who can be trusted with the rect. Of C’s--- letters, and who can forward 
them and any observations upon the sound, be pleased to ride over.”95 Establishing permanent 
contact with New York was vital. Woodhull, and later Townsend, provided insight into the 
British activity in New York City. During Woodhull’s time in New York City, he observed the 
British activity throughout and was able to transmit that information back to Brewster in 
Setauket via the couriers. Townsend was permanently stationed within the city to gather 
intelligence. He utilized his place as a merchant and businessman to familiarize himself with the 
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local British forces and observe their actions and movements. He was an established presence in 
the city, and he was able to use this to cover his espionage activities. Townsend was able to send 
information to Woodhull in Setauket via the same courier that Woodhull used while stationed in 
New York City. Austin Roe acted as a courier that transported information from the city into 
Setauket. He made his dangerous journey possible by claiming to have business as a merchant. 
From there, Woodhull gathered any information from Townsend in the city and waited to relay 
the information to Caleb Brewster, who brought his whaling boat over the Long Island Sound to 
meet with Woodhull. Anna Strong was able to signal the arrival of Brewster and let him know 
where Brewster was going to be by using her laundry as a signal. Brewster then took the 
intelligence back to Tallmadge who then eventually transmitted the information to Washington. 
By breaking up the tasks as such, it was easy to slip through the British defenses. While they had 
their hiccups, the Ring operated much smoother than had a single man been stationed in New 
York City with the same task. After Hercules Mulligan and Cato fell under suspicion by the 
British, they also began to transmit information to the Culper Ring. The Ring often utilized dead 
drops to reduce the amount the Ring operatives had to meet face to face. These also proved 
invaluable in times when the members found it unsafe or dangerous to meet and had to leave the 
area quickly.96 
 The Culper Ring became essential to the success of the American forces, especially in 
terms of New York. They provided key insight into the functions of the British army and gave 
Washington valuable information. The fact that they were an actual ring that consisted of 
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multiple people was revolutionary in itself. The earlier years of the war and the early intelligence 
effort proved that spying could not be the work of a single person stationed in their location, but 
rather a group of people working together. The Culper Ring quickly turned the tables on the 
British and were very successful at their craft. The next section analyzes the success the Culper 
Ring found and how the Ring itself factored into the overall success of the Continental Army. 
This success would not have been possible without the different techniques found throughout 
this section. These methods and techniques set the Ring apart from other espionage units during 
this time.  
  
  47 
Success of the Culper Ring 
 American espionage came a long way from its humble beginnings with Nathan Hale. By 
the end of the American Revolution, the Culper Ring became one of, if not the, most successful 
spy operations of the war. They also were able to remain in anonymity for years to come. Some 
of their impressive feats include exposing a planned attack by the British on French forces, 
revealing William Tryon’s raid to Tallmadge even though the information was delayed, 
uncovering a major counterfeiting plot, finding a notable American officer was going to turn on 
the Continental Army, and even saving Washington’s life, although this has no official record. 
This section examines the success of the Ring and how they shaped the espionage game for years 
to come.  
 The day-to-day successes of the Ring were immense. The Ring was able to provide 
Tallmadge and Washington with updates on the status of the British in New York and give them 
insight into what was happening in the city. A letter from Woodhull on December 12, 1778 
reads, “Since my last have endevourd to discover wheather I had errd in my No. 3 & 4 
concerning the State and conduct of the Enemy on the two Islands And am happyly convinced 
that I have given you a very particular account. Or at least as exact one as is possible for anyone 
to obtain without discovery. The enemy that went up the River, Were the Granedeers Light 
Infantry from Jamaica, & the Guards from the City & Lord Rodens Regm. that is Cantoned in 
the Bowery all Said Commd by G. Clinton, Who Since their return have bene very Silent.”97 
This early letter by Woodhull shows how the Ring was able to transmit information from within 
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New York. Woodhull gave another update on March 17, 1779 regarding troop movements and 
transports by General George Clinton who hoped to raid the Connecticut coast.98 This 
information gave Washington a chance to prepare for any possible attacks from the enemy. He 
instructed his generals to reinforce their positions and prepare for anything that Clinton might 
throw at them.99 Clinton did not attack and eventually returned to New York. This might have 
been due to the high alert the Continentals were on thanks to the work done by the Ring. In any 
case, Washington and his men stayed vigilant for any potential movements from Clinton. Much 
of the success the Ring found was in its ability to pass on small-scale information to the 
Continental Army. The Culper Ring was vital in giving Washington eyes and ears in New York. 
Simply providing updates on troop movements allowed Washington to prepare for the worst. 
Had Washington not known of Clinton’s movements and prepared for a potential raid, the end 
result might have been catastrophic. Any information, even small updates such as troop 
movements, proved invaluable to the war effort.  
 The Culper Ring uncovered a raid by William Tryon that was meant to divide 
Washington’s forces, allowing Clinton to easily defeat his adversary. Townsend sent his first 
report to Washington on June 29, 1779, outlining some odd behavior from the British. The 
British were preparing to make a journey into Connecticut soon after the letter was written.100 
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General Horatio Gates confirmed the movement of British troops for Washington. Washington 
wrote on this British movement in a letter to Congress, “a number of vessels with troops had left 
Rhode Island and directed their course up the Sound.” Instead of dropping the soldiers on the 
coast, the British troops were brought into Manhattan. It was clear that the British were up to 
something.101 Woodhull backed up this information with intelligence of his own in a letter to 
Tallmadge. He told Tallmadge to watch the Connecticut coast, as it was in danger.102 
Unfortunately, Tallmadge was unable to heed the warnings of the Culper Ring, as his camp was 
attacked by the British. During this attack, a letter from Washington and money for Woodhull 
was stolen, an act which caused Tallmadge to fear for the Ring’s safety.103 This attack was an 
advance of Tryon’s force, meant to divide the Continental Army. Although the Culper Ring 
moved quickly and efficiently, the information did not reach Washington until July 7, 1779, six 
days after it was sent. This was in part due to Tallmadge’s camp coming under attack as well as 
Washington being away from his headquarters. Once he received the news, Washington sprang 
into action and alerted his generals, although Tryon had already landed.104 Even though 
Washington could not stop Tryon’s raid, he was able to remain calm and not divide his forces. 
By not dividing his forces, Washington avoided Clinton’s trap. Clinton was not able to attack as 
he had planned. This gave Washington an opening to plan an attack on Clinton, one that was 
ultimately a success.105 While the information provided by the Culper Ring did not arrive in 
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Washington’s hands as quickly as they might have hoped, the Ring did their job well. The Ring 
was able to gather accurate information and pass it on to Washington. While the Continental 
Army was not ready for Tryon’s raids, they were ready for Clinton. Through months of work and 
support from the Culper Ring, Washington knew Clinton had something up his sleeve and did 
not divide his forces. Tryon’s raids did little but scare the Continentals. Washington remained 
steadfast in the face of Clinton’s plans, all thanks to work done by the Culper Ring.106  
 Townsend uncovered a scheme in November of 1779 that would have large ramifications 
on the Continental Army if left unchecked. Rose describes his find as “the British campaign to 
undermine the American war effort by destroying the Continental currency.”107 Townsend 
explained that the British had a large supply of paper and were intent on exhausting American 
currency. He wrote that “[the American’s] currency will be entirely depreciated, and that there 
will not be provision in the country to supply an Army [for] another campaign. That of the 
currency I am afraid will prove true, as they [the British] are indefatigable in increasing the 
quantity of it, Several reams of paper made for the last emission struck by Congress have been 
procured from Philadelphia.”108 Woodhull passed along his own account to Tallmadge in a 
separate letter.109 Previous attempts at British counterfeit needed a thicker substitute, as the 
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British could not procure the exact paper used for the Continental bills. However, after 
Townsend discovered the British had the blank paper used for Continental bills, it was 
imperative to translate this information to Washington. Washington was able to pass this 
intelligence along to Congress, an act which ultimately led to them recalling and retiring all of its 
bills.110  
 The Ring found success in July of 1780, following issues with Washington and their 
operation. Washington grew frustrated at the close of 1779. He urged the Ring to move 
intelligence quicker, even in the face of heightened British security. Throughout the early months 
of 1780, Washington continued to press his operatives to find a quicker way to deliver 
intelligence. This caused Tallmadge to experiment with other ways to reach Washington. He 
used his younger cousin, James Townsend, to travel through New Jersey to reach Washington. 
The younger Townsend was captured by Patriots who thought he was a British spy and had him 
arrested. Washington was frustrated at the situation and the fact that he had to get the younger 
Townsend released.111 His frustration grew as he faced tension from both Townsend and 
Woodhull. The fact that neither Townsend nor Woodhull found a quicker way to get information 
to him caused Washington a great deal of grief. Having to deal with getting the younger 
Townsend released caused Washington further annoyance. The last straw was when the Ring 
failed to provide any new information to Washington for a few months following these issues. 
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This led to Washington shutting down the operation of the Ring.112 He reactivated the Ring again 
when the French were approaching Rhode Island, and his timing could not have been more 
perfect.113 The Culper Ring uncovered a plot by the British to ambush and destroy the French 
forces coming to the Americans aid. Townsend relayed the information to Woodhull through 
invisible ink via Austin Roe. Townsend included a letter with Roe to give him an alibi should he 
be stopped en route to Woodhull.114 This intelligence brought Woodhull out of his sick bed, as he 
had fallen rather ill at this time, and into action. He left Townsend’s letter for Brewster to 
transport back to Tallmadge, with a note of his own stressing the urgency of the matter. “The 
enclosed requires your immediate departure this day by all means let not an hour pass for this 
day must not be lost you have news of the greatest consequence perhaps that ever happened to 
your country.”115 While Townsend’s original letter does not remain, Woodhull left a summary of 
its contents. He warned that General Clinton not only knew of the French landing in Rhode 
Island and was planning an assault on them with an impressive naval force.116 While Clinton 
ultimately did not attack the French in Rhode Island, the ability to move intelligence at the speed 
the Culper Ring did was impressive. While Washington was initially frustrated by the slow 
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transfer of intelligence by the Ring, this instance was evidence that the Ring was able to work 
together and move information quickly. They were able to get word of a potential tragedy and 
make the correct moves to set up proper defenses to it. The Culper Ring proved essential in the 
matter.  
 While the Culper Ring did not outright expose Benedict Arnold as a traitor, their work in 
New York helped uncover his treacherous ways. It was, in fact, their intelligence handler 
Tallmadge that made the catch. Based on the constant reports on and surprises from the British 
troops, Tallmadge was already on edge. His suspicious nature proved vital to uncovering Arnold. 
Tallmadge received reports from the Culper ring on troop movement from New York City and 
knew that something was amiss. When Major John André, the British counterpart to Tallmadge, 
was picked up in civilian clothes heading towards British territory, it was clear his intentions 
were no good. André was in American held territory meeting Arnold to discuss the possession of 
West Point. This was a big target for the British and one that was worth the risk of meeting 
Arnold in American territory. André, fully clad in his military uniform, met with Arnold on 
September 21, 1780. They met on the west coast bank of the Hudson River to discuss the plans 
to capture West Point. André’s boat was spotted by American troops and was fired on. From 
there, André decided to change into civilian clothes and journey back to British territory on foot. 
He was given a pass from Arnold and traveled towards British held territory at White Plains.117 
As he was traveling towards safety, he was stopped by a patrol. Thinking they were British, he 
announced where his allegiance lay. They discovered he held the secret plans to West Point and 
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immediately marked him as a spy. Though André tried to bribe his captors, they brought him in 
anyway.118  Tallmadge came to assess the situation as soon as he learned of it. The officer that 
held André, Colonel Jameson located at North Castle, sent both André and a letter explaining the 
situation to Arnold. General Arnold was Colonel Jameson’s superior officer and he felt he 
needed to inform him of what happened.119 He sent his findings to Washington as well. 
Tallmadge, however, insisted on bringing André back, instead of sending him to Arnold. André 
was interrogated by Tallmadge and eventually confessed. André was sentenced to death and was 
executed for espionage while Arnold escaped. Thus, the infamous career of John André came to 
a close. Although Arnold escaped, the work done by the Culper Ring, and ultimately Tallmadge, 
made it clear that the British operation was not a success. The Continental Army was able to put 
André’s, and in fact the British, espionage activities to a halt.120 
 Towards the end of the war, the Culper Ring did not provide as much key intelligence. 
Rose writes, “From 1781 onwards, a new breed of spy had emerged, men like William Heron 
whose allegiances and motives were distinctly murky.”121 The new breed of spy lacked any kind 
of virtue or dedication that made the members of the Culper Ring true patriots. Rose argues that 
espionage was becoming a more professional, cynical, and backstabbing way of life. While these 
new spies cared more for currency than for country, they still experienced a shift in how their 
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superiors looked at espionage. While the Culper Ring’s days came to a close, they impacted the 
thought process on espionage. They had proven successful in their mission. While oftentimes 
their information was slow, or even came too late, they had given Washington eyes and ears in 
New York when he needed it most. The Ring was able to provide information in one of the most 
vital areas of the war. Of course, following the Battle of Yorktown in 1781, there really was not 
much need for espionage. Peace talks began and the war was all but over. The next two years 
really did not see much espionage. The Culper Ring helped on an "ad hoc basis,” coming to 
Tallmadge’s aid when he truly needed them.122 The war effort by the Continental Army owed its 
success, at least partly, to this Ring. They provided key intelligence up until 1781 and were 
paramount in securing decisive information for the new found country. Their success was found 
in their ability to work together. As stated in the section on their methods, the Culper Ring was 
able to work as a cohesive unit to transmit intelligence. The Ring was able to do what singular 
agents struggled to do: maintain a good and effective intelligence gathering operation. Without 
the Culper Ring, the war very well might have ended differently. Had Clinton’s plan to divide 
Washington’s troops been a success, Washington might have fallen in 1779. Had Congress not 
recalled their currency in 1780 because of the Culper Ring’s warning, the Continental Army 
might not have been able to continue fighting the war. The Culper Ring demonstrated its 
efficiency and speed which helped Washington avoid potential disaster. Tallmadge had enough 
experience with espionage to help uncover Benedict Arnold as a traitor and expose John André 
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as a spy. Had things gone differently in any of these situations, the end result could have been 
catastrophic.  
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British Espionage 
 The purpose of this section is to examine the British stance on espionage. The majority of 
this thesis deals with the American espionage in the war, specifically that of the Culper Ring. 
However, the Americans had intelligence counterparts in the British Army. This section dives 
deeper into what exactly that looked like.  
 British intelligence was not as adept as Washington’s was. Early in the war, a doctor 
serving the Continental Army as Chief Physician and Director General was caught sending 
information to the British. Dr. Benjamin Church was corresponding with General Thomas Gage. 
Rachel Revere wrote to her husband following his midnight ride in which she trusted to Dr. 
Church. She wrote, “My Dear by Doctor Church I send a hundred and twenty-five pounds and 
beg you will take the best care of yourself…”123 Instead of bringing the letter to Revere, he 
brought the letter to Gage. This was caught early in the war and Church was arrested.  David 
Farnsworth was another notable British espionage agent during the war. He was part of a plot to 
counterfeit American currency and help ruin the American economy. He was caught with over 
$10,000 in forged American currency.124 He was tried and executed for his espionage 
involvement.125 The British were constantly falling behind the Americans in terms of espionage 
and were not as skilled as the Continentals proved to be. This is in part due to their leadership. 
George Washington and Benjamin Tallmadge were wholeheartedly invested in their covert 
operations. The British generals typically did not care for espionage. The British had a tendency 
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to use military scouts to gather information on their enemy. For a time, the only one that handled 
any intelligence was General Clinton himself. Clinton also utilized small, private intelligence 
networks to gather information, although they were not entirely accurate or helpful. For ages, 
men like Clinton were honor bound to do the right thing. They did not have the freedom to do 
what was necessary as the Americans did. America presented an odd problem for British 
intelligence. The tough land was filled with difficult people and flimsy loyalty. The British found 
themselves at a disadvantage in the world of espionage while America proved successful. The 
greatest army in the world was up against the home team, and they had the advantage.126  
 Another leading figure in British Intelligence was the leader of the Queen’s Rangers, 
Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe. Intelligence was not his primary goal. He did, however, 
have spies of his own and even hunted members of the Culper Ring at one point. Born in 1752, 
Simcoe rose through the ranks of the British army. He took control of the Queen’s Rangers in 
1777.127 While Simcoe was not primarily in charge of intelligence, his spies were able to provide 
him with top notch information. In his military journal, he describes how successful his spies 
were. “Lt. Col. Simcoe understood that Niham, an Indian chief, and some of his tribe, were with 
the enemy; and by his spies, who were excellent, he was informed that they were highly elated at 
the retreat of Emmerick’s corps, and applied it to the whole of the light troops at 
Kingsbridge.”128 Simcoe was able to gather good intelligence; however, he was not focused on 
espionage during the war.  
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 In May of 1779, Clinton appointed Captain John André as the new director of British 
intelligence. André became the equivalent of Tallmadge for the British Army. It was this move 
that changed espionage for the British. André’s first move in his new role was to organize the 
intelligence and keep track of all the information he was receiving. While André made decisions 
that helped the British intelligence effort, he was still not very proficient in terms of espionage. 
Rose compares André to Nathan Hale, as the two shared many striking characteristics. Their 
biggest similarity, according to Rose, is that both were unsuited for espionage. In a letter written 
to Washington, André examined his time in espionage and came to the conclusion that he was 
“too little accustomed to duplicity.”129 While he was not as well suited for espionage as his 
American counterparts, John André quickly became the backbone of British intelligence in the 
war. André’s status reflected the status of British intelligence: both were inexperienced, 
understaffed, and outsmarted. André did his best and even acquired a defector, Benedict Arnold. 
However, in the end, he made fatal mistakes that cost him his life.130 André describes his end 
days in a letter to his superior, General Clinton. “The Events of coming within an enemies post 
and of Changing my dress which led me to my present Situation were contrary to my own 
Intentions as they were to your Orders; and the circuitous route which I took to return was 
imposed (perhaps unavoidably) without alternative upon me. I am perfectly and tranquil in mind 
and prepared for any Fate to which an honest Zeal for my Kings Service may have devoted 
me.”131 André was devoted to his cause till the end of his life, even in the face of death. 
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 Benedict Arnold reflected a darker side of espionage. Willing to betray his post for 
money and recognition, he has gone down in history as one of the biggest traitors to America. He 
began feeding the British intelligence by at least 1780, as he was instrumental in the 
Rochambeau affair.132 General Jean Baptiste Donation de Vigneur, Comte de Rochambeau, 
landed his French forces in Rhode Island. Arnold had given this information to the British in 
order for them to prepare an attack on the French forces. The plan ultimately never came to 
fruition, as Clinton lacked the proper means to successfully launch an assault against those in 
Rhode Island.133 A letter from Arnold explains the French arrival in American and explains his 
desire to work with the British. “General Washington expects on the arrival of the French Troops 
to collect 30,000 Troops . . . I can render the most essential Services, and which will be in my 
disposal,”134  Most important, Benedict Arnold planned to surrender the plans to West Point. In 
return, he was to be rewarded handsomely. Before this deal completely went through, André was 
captured, and Arnold had to flee to safety with the British.135  
 After André’s death, intelligence fell to Major Oliver De Lancey and his two aides. 
American espionage focused on the individual efforts and set ups of each spy. For example, 
Benjamin Tallmadge was in charge of the Culper Ring. He looked after his own agents 
personally and did not have to worry about espionage efforts in other areas. He created his own 
code and intelligence network. De Lancey made sure his aides shared codes, procedures, and 
operatives. One of his aides could meet with an operative one week, and it could potentially be 
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different the next week. While this might seem dangerous or foolish, by doing so, De Lancey 
ensured no one in his organization was indispensable and that one single person did not prove 
vital to his operations. De Lancey kept tabs on the enemy forces and had some of his men spying 
on the French. He kept track of their naval movements through one of his agents, Captain 
Nehemiah Marks.136 He was not as personal as the Americans were in terms of their operatives. 
Because of this, he was not able to win the trust of his men as Tallmadge had. He was so 
removed from his agents, he even fell for a hoax regarding one of his men, William Heron. 
William Heron acted as a double agent. He gave information to De Lancey while reporting what 
he knew to the Americans. While he fed the British lower level information, the information he 
gave the Americans was valuable. He gave the British false reports of defection and led British 
intelligence astray. De Lancey did not do much else to aid British intelligence.137  
 While this thesis primarily centers on American espionage in the war, it is important to 
understand the position the British were in. They were a step behind their American counterparts. 
Their leaders did not know how to effectively use espionage to their advantage. While men like 
George Washington and Benjamin Tallmadge thrived in the espionage world, General Clinton, 
John André, and later Oliver De Lancey were subpar. They continuously played catch up and 
never quite caught up to the American spies. 
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Conclusion 
 The Culper Ring was incredibly effective during the war. Without the work the Ring did, 
the outcome of the war might very well have been different. They pushed the boundaries on what 
espionage meant, in a time when espionage itself was not something to be proud of. The men and 
women involved in the Culper Ring knew that being a spy was neither glamorous nor incredibly 
rewarding. They were not in it for the money. Although they often asked to be reimbursed, this 
was not their main concern. Their main concern was fighting for what they believed in and doing 
so in a way that they were able to. While they could not, or would not, necessarily be on the 
frontline fighting the war, they found their own ways, at times reluctantly, to do their part for the 
war effort. The men and women involved in the Culper Ring risked everything for the belief in 
their country. They should be regarded as heroes for what they did; they willingly endangered 
their lives and well-being for something much bigger than themselves. 
 Prior to the establishment of the Culper Ring, espionage in America was a mess. 
Washington utilized mostly singular agents that often turned out poorly. While some singular 
agents, like Hercules Mulligan and Cato, John Honeyman, and Enoch Crosby, found limited 
success throughout the war, theirs did not measure up to the constant triumph found in the 
Culper Ring. By just having an organized unit with a support system, the Culper Ring was able 
to accomplish much more than its predecessors. The Culper Ring transformed the face of 
American espionage.138 No longer did the United States place singular agents in the field with no 
support or backup, instead, they began to focus their efforts on actual rings and organizations.  
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 The dedicated agents of the Culper Ring were able to create an effective intelligence 
supply chain for Washington. The Ring functioned as a cohesive unit. Each person played their 
part in order for the whole Ring to succeed. Washington oversaw a great spy ring. He sat as a 
spymaster over the most revolutionary group of people in espionage history.  
 The Culper Ring was able to push and use the boundaries of social norms at the time, 
which made espionage easier for its members. Women and slaves were almost invisible during 
the American Revolution. Anna Strong’s involvement in the ring, and potentially the mysterious 
355, were important. While these members were not the driving force of the Ring’s activity, it 
was their involvement that made things easier for the Culper Ring. Anna Strong could do her 
part for the Ring easily, because she was doing tasks expected of her as a woman. The women in 
espionage used their gender roles as a cover for the activities they were involved in. The same 
can be said for slaves during the war. While not directly involved with the Culper Ring, at least 
at first, Cato used his status as a slave to sneak intelligence around. Slaves were often overlooked 
because of their social standing. This made them a perfect conduit for transmitting information. 
It was not often that a slave was questioned in depth. Things were said in front of slaves that 
would not be said in front of other people, simply because the slaves were invisible to the 
“superior” white men. This false sense of superiority was easily exploited in the espionage effort. 
Utilizing members that sat outside of the typical white, landowning male who held all the power 
was key in the success of the Culper Ring, as well as espionage as a whole. 
 Honor played a large part in the everyday lives of both British and American citizens. 
Honor and standing in society went hand in hand with each other. If a person did not have great 
honor, they often did not sit well in society. The way one was viewed by their peers was 
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important in this day and age. Trickery and deceit were not popular qualities to exude during the 
late 1700s. While the British maintained this view well into the war, Washington had no 
problems with a bit of trickery. This was solely out of necessity, as Washington understood he 
was up against a bigger and better trained enemy.  He was completely on board with allowing 
Townsend to play the part of a loyal British subject in order to gather intelligence in the city. He 
supported the Ring falling in with the enemy to bring back information for him. Washington was 
able to establish an organized ring of operatives that were willing to risk their honor for their 
country. The fact that being a spy was not the honorable thing to do made the sacrifices by the 
Culper Ring that much more impressive.  
 The Culper Ring used some impressive methods to complete their task. They created a 
codebook that was used throughout the war. While this code was not the most unbreakable code 
to ever be made, it served their purpose well. It was easily understood by the agents in the Ring 
and made their work a bit more secure. They also utilized invisible ink developed by James Jay. 
Their most effective method truly was their approach to espionage. Simply having a support 
system greatly helped their cause. The Culper Ring’s methods bore results. Multiple different 
plots by the British stationed in New York were discovered by the Ring. The Ring provided 
Washington with much needed eyes and ears in New York City.  
 The British espionage paled in comparison to that of the Culper Ring. John André 
became the head of British intelligence during the war. He was inexperienced and not as adept at 
spy work as Tallmadge was. His General, Clinton, was a product of Old-World honor and did 
not appreciate the art of espionage. The British did not really find success until they turned 
Benedict Arnold as a traitor. Interestingly, both the British and Americans utilized women. These 
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women were able to manipulate their gender roles and use them to their advantage. The Culper 
Ring was superior to the espionage effort made by the British.  
 The Culper Ring was vital to the American war effort. They transformed intelligence and 
made important strides during the war. The Culper Ring was able to use individuals that sat 
outside of the cultural norm and social class. In a letter to Charles Scott, Washington wrote, 
“Vague and idle stories therefore, which have no foundation in fact, ought not to be 
communicated by the person employed because false intelligence may prove worse than none; he 
should therefore examine well into and compare matters before he transmits accounts, always 
distinguishing facts of his own knowledge from reports.”139 The Culper Ring achieved exactly 
what Washington wanted. The efforts made by the Ring changed espionage forever. Prior to the 
establishment of the ring, American spies were typically alone. George Washington and 
Benjamin Tallmadge created an effective Ring that was organized as a whole unit. Not only did 
this Ring change the course of the war, it changed the course of American espionage as a whole.  
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